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Public Health Campaigns to Change
Industry Practices That Damage Health:
An Analysis of 12 Case Studies
Nicholas Freudenberg, DrPH
Sarah Picard Bradley, MS
Monica Serrano, MPH
Industry practices such as advertising, production of unsafe products, and efforts to defeat health legislation
play a major role in current patterns of U.S. ill health. Changing these practices may be a promising strategy to
promote health. The authors analyze 12 campaigns designed to modify the health-related practices of U.S. cor-
porations in the alcohol, automobile, food and beverage, firearms, pharmaceutical, and tobacco industries. The
objectives are to examine the interactions between advocacy campaigns and industry opponents; explore the
roles of government, researchers, and media; and identify characteristics of campaigns that are effective in
changing health-damaging practices. The authors compared campaigns that operate at different levels of orga-
nization and use different strategies. Findings suggest that many campaigns achieve policy or mobilization out-
comes that may contribute to improved health; local campaigns may be more effective than national ones; and
advocates frequently frame their campaigns on the themes of children’s health and social justice.
Keywords: corporations; advocacy; health promotion
In the past several years, public health researchers, educators, advocates, and others
have called attention to growing evidence that industry practices can contribute to poor
health (Angell, 2004; Bradsher, 2002; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
[CDC], 2001, 2002; Hemenway, 2004; Nestle, 2002). Advertising by the tobacco, alco-
hol, and fast food industries; production and distribution of products lacking available
safety technology by the automobile and gun industries; and political involvement to
defeat health legislation by the tobacco and pharmaceutical industries exemplify prac-
tices that damage health. In response, health advocates, local elected officials, con-
sumer activists, and others have mobilized to press for changes in corporate behavior as
a method of improving population health (Freudenberg, 2005).
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In this report, we describe and analyze 12 campaigns designed to modify the health-
related practices of U.S. corporations. Our objectives are to examine the interactions
between advocacy campaigns and their industry opponents; explore the roles of govern-
ment, researchers, and media; and identify characteristics of campaigns that are more or
less effective in changing health-damaging practices. By comparing campaigns that oper-
ate at different levels of organization (e.g., local, state, and national), use different strate-
gies (e.g., community organizing, legislation, litigation), and target different industries
(e.g., tobacco, food, alcohol, automobiles), we hope to gain insights that can guide public
health research and practice. More broadly, we aim to develop a paradigm and evidence
base that expands the repertoire of interventions so as to include not only strategies that
seek to change the health behavior of individuals and communities but also to alter cor-
porate and organizational practices and policies that contribute to ill health.
BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
In this study, we focus on six industries (alcohol, automobile, firearm, food and bev-
erages, pharmaceutical, and tobacco) whose practices and products have been linked
with a wide range of negative health outcomes, including heart disease, cancer, stroke,
respiratory illnesses, obesity, and injuries, among others. Evidence suggests that the
products of these sectors have a substantial impact on current U.S. morbidity and mor-
tality (Angell, 2004; CDC 2001, 2002; Hemenway, 2004; Mokdad et al., 2004;
Mokdad, Marks, Stroup, & Gerberding, 2005; Yach, Hawkes, Gould, & Hofman, 2004).
In addition, the practices of each of these industries have elicited responses from health,
consumer, environmental, and other activists, providing a body of evidence to examine
for insights into effective advocacy strategies for reducing the impact of corporate poli-
cies on health (Freudenberg, 2005).
Industry practices that contribute to unhealthy behavior include advertising, product
design, pricing, strategic marketing, public relations, lobbying, and campaign contribu-
tions. For example, the tobacco industry has targeted advertising at youth and women,
increasing their smoking rates (Carpenter, Wayne, & Connolly, 2005); soft drink compa-
nies establish contracts that give them exclusive rights to market their products in schools,
contributing to obesity (Nestle, 2000); the automobile industry has heavily promoted pol-
luting and accident-prone sports utility vehicles (SUVs), and lobbied against stricter safety
and environmental standards (Bradsher, 2003); and the pharmaceutical industry has pro-
moted profitable drugs that its own research has shown to be dangerous (Angell, 2004).
In recent decades, industry efforts to increase promotion of harmful products and reduce
public control of such practices appear to have grown (Anderson & Cavanaugh, 2000).
Industry has hired more lobbyists (Center for Responsive Politics, 2004; Pear, 2005),
increased contributions to political campaigns (Center for Responsive Politics, 2004),
found new venues for advertising and other commercial activities (General Accounting
Office, 2004; Schor, 2004), targeted vulnerable populations for advertising (Alaniz, 1998;
Austin & Rich, 2001), moved to limit their liability for harmful products (Bohme,
Zorabedian, & Egilman, 2005), and lower their taxes (Browning, 2004). Thus, it seems
likely that the health-damaging consequences of corporate practices will increase.
In recent years, a variety of organizations and researchers have suggested that policy-
level interventions may be an effective tool for promoting and protecting the public’s health
(e.g., Brownson, Hair-Joshu, & Luke, 2006; Institute of Medicine, 2003; Mittelmark,
1999). In some cases, such advocacy has resulted in changes in corporate practices. For
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example, the Attorneys General Master Tobacco Settlement Agreement ended outdoor
tobacco advertising, increased excise taxes on cigarettes, restricted marketing toward
youth, and established a fund for tobacco prevention and education initiatives for youth
(Schroeder, 2004). In the early 1990s, advocacy efforts strengthened federal gun control
regulations (Hemenway, 2004), and food and nutrition advocates helped to convince the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to require food companies to label the trans-fat con-
tent of food products (FDA, 2003). Trans fats have been associated with tens of thousands
of excess heart-disease deaths (Willett et al., 1993). Despite these accomplishments, few
researchers have systematically investigated health advocacy to change corporate practices
across industries or strategies. As a result, health practitioners have lacked a body of evi-
dence to guide or evaluate such interventions. This report seeks to meet this need.
METHOD
To gain insights into the dynamics of these campaigns, we chose a multiple-case-
history methodology. Social scientists use case histories to understand better interac-
tions among variables of interest in changing contexts and to develop hypotheses that
can then be tested using more quantitative methods (Hamel, Dufour, & Fortin, 1993).
Multiple-case-study designs can yield findings that are generalizable to other settings
(Yin, 1994), and investigators have recommended the use of this method to deepen
understanding of mobilizations for health (Lofland, 1996). After identifying several
variables of interest (e.g., campaign objectives, duration, advocacy strategies, suc-
cesses, obstacles), we developed a multiple-case-history design that enabled us to
describe a variety of internal and external dynamics and contextual factors specific to
individual campaigns and then to compare findings across campaigns.
The unit of analysis in this study is the individual health advocacy campaign. We
defined a campaign as an advocacy initiative in which one or more organizations
mounted targeted activities of variable duration designed to achieve explicit changes in
corporate or industry practices perceived to harm health. Although these campaigns
may have been supported by and contributed to social movements, broader and more
ongoing popular mobilizations (Lofland, 1996), the definition used here distinguishes
between the more time- and objective-limited campaign and broader social movements.
Because there is no listing of the universe of such campaigns, we used a variety of
Internet and computer-based research strategies (e.g., use of Google for general searches,
Pub Med for peer-reviewed scientific reports, the Nexis and Thomas databases for media
and legislative information, and existing Internet networks linking various advocacy
groups and campaigns) to develop a database of campaigns designed to change health-
damaging corporate practices. Search terms included “advocacy,” “health,” and products
of the six target industries. Once a relevant source was identified, we followed links to
other sources and added new, more specific search terms, such as the name of an advo-
cacy organization, and then searched for additional materials describing identified cam-
paigns. Given the number of search processes used and the large number of “hits” for
various search combinations (e.g., a search for “health,” “advocacy,” and “tobacco” on
Google yielded 1.25 million hits), we did not screen or count all hits, focusing instead
on finding descriptions of activities that met our criteria.
To be included in the database, a campaign had to meet these criteria: Its activities
were directed at a specific practice in one of the six selected industries (alcohol, auto-
mobile, firearms, food and beverages, pharmaceuticals, and tobacco), it was designed
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to influence changes in corporate practices, and it identified clearly defined and specific
objectives related to health.
Ultimately, we identified 25 campaigns that met these criteria. Once a campaign was
entered in our database, staff created a file that contained all relevant material for that
campaign. After reviewing the files for 25 campaigns, we selected a stratified conve-
nience sample of 12 campaigns, 2 from each of the six target industries. To ensure that
sufficient material was available for a case history, we selected only campaigns for which
material was available from at least three separate sources, including two independent
sources (e.g., media or advocacy reports, campaign Web sites, government or industry
documents). Because advocacy campaigns seek change at different levels of organiza-
tion (e.g., local, state or regional, and national) and use different strategies, we chose an
assortment of initiatives that reflected this diversity. Using the materials so assembled, a
team member prepared a case history of the campaign, following a standard outline with
sections on the relevant policy background; descriptions of the primary advocacy orga-
nization or coalition; advocacy activities; government, media, and industry responses to
these advocacy activities; an assessment of the impact of the campaign (i.e., changes in
policy, practices, or health that can reasonably be attributed to campaign); an appraisal
of factors facilitating or impeding success, and lessons learned. In 2 of the 12 cases
selected, we found previously published case studies, which became part of our file. All
case histories included content for each section of the outline. All three authors then
reviewed the 12 case studies independently to identify themes for comparison across
campaigns. This process yielded a consolidated list of 12 broad themes: contextual
issues (factors affecting the broader climate in which campaign took place), advocates’
strategies and tactics (e.g., media advocacy, community organizing, litigation, legislative
advocacy); industry/opponent strategies and tactics to counter-campaign (e.g., public
relations, litigation, strategic compromise); public health consequences of industry prac-
tices; “framing” efforts by industry and advocates; roles of scientists and public health
professionals on both sides of issue; roles of local, state, and federal government; role of
media; successes of campaigns; facilitators of success; obstacles to success; and lessons
learned. Each author then reviewed all 12 written case histories and coded them themat-
ically using these 12 categories. Some variables were coded dichotomously (e.g., use of
a particular strategy or participation of a specific stakeholder), whereas others were
described more qualitatively (e.g., the differing roles of government in the campaigns).
In most cases, raters assigned text segments in the case histories to the same themes,
reassuring concerns about interrater reliability, a key component to assessing the valid-
ity and generalizability of qualitative data (Berg, 1998). In addition, we prepared tables
summarizing key facts and characteristics of the 12 campaigns.
Finally, to be able to compare the characteristics of more and less effective cam-
paigns, each author independently rated each campaign on its success in achieving its
stated objectives and in mobilizing constituencies. We used a 5-point scale ranging
from 1 (fully successful) to 5 (not successful) on these two criteria. Overall, raters
agreed within 1 point on the scale 75% of the time. The three ratings were averaged to
obtain a mean score on each of the two criteria.
Our conceptualization of the relationships among variables of interest in this study
is illustrated in Figure 1, a conceptual framework for the study of public health advo-
cacy campaigns to change corporate practices. Our research seeks to describe the rele-
vant behavior of the players shown in columns 1 and 2, to elucidate the pathways by
which the changes in columns 3 and 4 occur, and to analyze the variety of interactions
symbolized by the arrows.
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FINDINGS
Description of Campaigns
The 12 campaigns, all carried out in the past 15 years, sought to modify a variety of
corporate practices. Campaign objectives included achieving changes in distribution,
advertising, or promotion of health-damaging products so as to reduce access; requir-
ing industry to label harmful products; reducing pollution through manufacturing and
emissions regulation; and lowering prices of lifesaving drugs to increase access. These
campaigns had the potential to reduce such serious health problems as underage drink-
ing and its associated injuries and deaths, pollution-related respiratory conditions,
tobacco-related heart disease and cancer, gun-related injuries and deaths, automobile
injuries and deaths, obesity, and over- and underuse of prescription drugs. Brief descrip-
tions of the campaigns, organized by target industry, illustrate the diversity of practice.
Alcohol
Stop Alcopops (1997-present) and the Alcohol Free Sports TV (2003-present) were
national campaigns that worked to reduce alcohol promotion to youth. The Alcohol
Policies Project at the Center for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI) supported the
Stop Alcopop campaign, which included local efforts in Washington, D.C., New York
City, and elsewhere. Alcohol companies produced and marketed sweetened, high-
alcohol-concentration beverages (“alcopops”) in hopes of expanding their market. As
one observer noted, “Sales of traditional alcoholic beverages are in decline, so compa-
nies are looking for other categories to sell. . . . Brewers have been looking for stuff that





















Social, political, and economic context
Figure 1. A conceptual model for the study of advocacy campaigns to change health-damaging
corporate practices.
pool.” (Richard, 1997). The campaign works to remove alcopops from the market by
targeting both federal regulatory agencies and local retailers.
Alcohol Free Sports TV, also initiated by CSPI, mobilized colleges and allied pro-
fessionals to seek to persuade the National College Athletic Association to end television
advertising of beer during its events. The NCAA and many collegiate members depend
on contributions and advertising revenue from the brewer Anheuser-Busch and others.
Citing public support for a ban and recent research on the deleterious health effects of
binge drinking on college campuses, by 2005, the campaign had received the endorse-
ment of 180 organizations and more than 220 schools had agreed to ban alcohol adver-
tising from local broadcasts of sports events. As of early 2006, the campaign was still
working toward a full ban on alcohol advertising during NCAA-sponsored events.
Automobiles
The campaign to Strengthen California Emissions Standards (2002-present) sup-
ported an effort by the quasi-public agency the California Air Resources Board to estab-
lish stricter state auto emissions standards than mandated by federal law to reduce
greenhouse gases and global warming. State and national environmental organizations
worked to help the board pass strict standards in 2004, which were then challenged in
court by the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, an industry trade group, a legal
action that continues. Other states have since followed California’s lead in tightening
emission standards.
Improve SUV Fuel Efficiency (1997-present), a national campaign led by the Sierra
Club, an environmental group, seeks to strengthen regulation of SUVs to reduce air pol-
lution. The campaign has used both adversarial and collaborative strategies, including a
partnership with Ford Motor Company, to produce less-polluting hybrid SUVs.
Firearms
The Million Mom March for Gun Control (1999-2000) and Close Loophole on Gun
Advertising (2001-present) used very different strategies to reduce access to guns and
establish stricter accountability for gun marketing. The Million Mom March organized
a protest that attracted tens of thousands of people from across the United States and
sought to pressure Congress and the president to make gun control a higher national pri-
ority. It received broad media attention and brought new activists into the gun control
movement. The campaign Close the Loophole on Gun Advertising achieved success
incrementally, receiving commitments to eliminate classified gun advertising by unli-
censed dealers one newspaper at a time. At least 33 newspapers across the country have
changed their policies since the campaign’s inception.
Food and Beverages
Get Coke out of Seattle Schools (1996-2004) was a local campaign to mobilize
Seattle area parents and the school board to revoke the system’s exclusive “pouring
rights” for the Coca-Cola Company. Although the contract with Coke was terminated
in 2003, the lead campaign organization, Citizens’ Campaign for Commercial Free
Schools, continues to work to improve the nutritional content of school food and reduce
the influence of food and beverage companies.
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In 1994, the CSPI petitioned the FDA to require that food manufacturers label the
trans fatty acid (trans fat) content of their food products. The petition was based on
research showing that replacing trans fats with healthier oils could prevent between
30,000 and 100,000 premature cardiovascular deaths in the United States each year. The
Label or Ban Trans Fats campaign (1994-present), joined by other organizations, has
continued to work on this goal both locally and nationally. Campaign lawsuits against
McDonalds and Kraft Foods led to settlements that reduced the trans fat contents in
these companies’ products. In 2006, the FDA required U.S. food companies to label the
trans fat content of all products.
Pharmaceuticals
The Lower Price of Norvir (2003-2004) campaign confronted and lost a battle with
Abbott Pharmaceuticals (2004) to roll back the price of Norvir, a critical component in
many HIV drug “cocktails.” This campaign, led by the AIDS Treatment Action
Coalition, was, however, able to gain visibility for issues around treatment access, and
lawsuits won some intermediary goals for advocates.
Stop Patient Channel Drug Advertising (1998-2003) worked to stop the marketing of
prescription drugs on a private television network operated by General Electric and
broadcast directly to patients in their hospital beds. Many hospitals and health providers
groups endorsed the campaign, led by the national group Commercial Alert, and the
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organization modified its definition
of patient education in response to the campaign.
Tobacco
Stop Uptown Cigarettes (1990-1992), the earliest campaign described here, led a
successful effort in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania to end the development of Uptown cig-
arettes, an R. J. Reynolds Company brand targeted for Black smokers. With the help of
local clergy, community leaders, and some national groups, Stop Uptown Cigarettes
was able to halt the pilot before any cigarettes hit the shelves.
Fifteen years later, the National African American Tobacco Prevention Network
organized the Fight Kool Cigarettes Target Marketing campaign (2004) to challenge
Kool, also marketed by R. J. Reynolds. The company’s marketing plan targeted African
American youth, and promoted Kool cigarettes using hip-hop themes and flavored
“Kool Mixx” cigarettes. With the support of several state attorneys general, the cam-
paign won the removal of the flavored cigarettes as well as a $1.4 million settlement.
Advocacy Strategies
In the case studies, we identified 11 distinct strategies that the campaigns used to
achieve their goals, as shown in Table 1. Three strategies—coalition building, media
advocacy, and public mobilization—were used by at least half the campaigns. Other
commonly used strategies were policy advocacy, community organization, litigation,
letter writing, and public protest. Only one campaign worked directly with industry to
achieve its goals. The majority of campaigns studied used multiple strategies, with a
mean of 4.3. Our sources did not enable us to compare the intensity of the campaigns,
another potentially significant variable of interest.


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A few campaigns used innovative strategies to reach new constituencies. For
example, the Label or Ban Trans Fats campaign joined with local restaurant owners in
Tiburon, California to create the first “trans fat-free city” in the United States. All 18
city restaurateurs agreed to use trans fat-free cooking oil (“Ban Trans Fat,” 2004),
making Tiburon a model for a local business-friendly approach to improving diets. In
another example, the Sierra Club developed a partnership with Ford Motor Company to
introduce and promote technology that they claimed would improve the company’s
SUVs fuel economy by 25% during 5 years (Sierra Club, 2005).
Industry Response to Campaigns
By definition, campaigns to alter health-damaging practices have a target: the indus-
try or organization whose policies advocates hope to change. Among the 12 campaigns,
4 chose a specific corporate target, 3 a government body, 3 some intermediary private
organization (e.g. the National Collegiate Athletic Association, newspapers that adver-
tised unlicensed gun dealers), and 2 a trade association or other industry group.
These targets and their supporters (e.g., other industry groups, supportive citizen
organizations such as the National Rifle Association) used a variety of strategies to
counter the campaigns, including public relations, litigation, and strategic compromise.
Two common responses were to ignore opponents, often possible in the circumstances
in which health advocates had far fewer resources than their industry opponents, or to
adopt a more aggressive stance, publicly denying advocates’ claims, defending their
own practices and delaying action through use of political processes. As noted, in one
case, the targeted company and the advocacy organization developed a collaborative
strategy.
In many cases, industry responded to campaigns by using strategies similar to those
used by advocates (e.g., media advocacy, lobbying government officials, litigation, or
the promotion of scientific evidence supporting their perspective). In these interactions,
advocacy campaigns and their opponents competed to define the core campaign issues
and win popular or political support for their interpretation.
Involvement of Other Parties
Campaigns interacted not only with their opponents but also with a variety of other
stakeholders, including scientists, public health professionals, government officials and
agencies, community organizations, national advocacy groups, and others (see Table 2).
On average, campaigns interacted with six of these constituencies. The most common
interactions were with national advocacy organizations (all 12 campaigns) and scientists,
community organizations, citizens, and government (10 each). Other participants in the
campaigns (not shown in table) were local clergy, small businesses, and companies.
Framing Advocacy Campaigns
In these campaigns, the contest for public support led advocates and their opponents
to compete to “frame” the relevant issues (e.g., tobacco and alcohol abuse, gun control,
access to prescription drugs, and obesity) so as to achieve their objectives. Interpreting
the framing of social problems has recently emerged as a popular strategy in commu-
nications, social science, and public health research (Dorfman, Wallack, & Woodruff,
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2005; Entman, 1993). Frames have been described as tools for defining a problem,
diagnosing its cause, justifying treatments for the problem, and predicting its likely
effects (Entman, 1993, p. 52). In this study, our case analyses found that frames emerged
from the news media coverage of the campaigns as well as the materials developed by
advocates, researchers, and their opponents.
In several campaigns, advocates and industry groups offered similar competing
frames for the conflict. Advocates portrayed advertising or promotional campaigns as
an effort to target vulnerable groups as new markets despite evidence that the product
harmed health, (e.g., R. J. Reynolds targets African American youth with the Kool
Mixx campaign). On the other side, industry representatives argued that advertising
legal products is free speech that is critical to maintaining market share in a free econ-
omy. This conflict between targeting vulnerable groups and free speech emerged
repeatedly across campaigns, including Label or Ban Trans Fats, Fight Kool Cigarettes
Marketing, Close Loophole on Gun Advertising, Get Coke out of Seattle Schools,
Alcohol Free Sports TV, and Stop Patient Channel Drug Advertising.
Several campaigns effectively framed their issues by calling attention to the dis-
parate impact of corporate activities on the health of vulnerable populations, including
youth, poor communities, and communities of color. Both tobacco prevention cam-
paigns focused on the industry’s targeting of African American communities, and both
used coalition building in these communities to change corporate practices. Similarly,
the alcohol campaigns focused on the negative effects of targeting alcohol to youth mar-
kets, and the pharmaceutical campaigns emphasized the disparities in access to med-
ication or control of health care choices for poor and medically underserved groups.
This emphasis on disparate impact added a social justice dimension to the campaigns.
Industry groups often responded to these charges by accusing advocates of seeking to
impose their views on others and denying choice to individuals.
Role of News Media
To some extent, the news media emerged as another player in these campaigns. Both
local and national media played key roles in framing issues, raising awareness, and
mobilizing various constituencies. In several campaigns (e.g., Label or Ban Trans Fats,
Stop Uptown Cigarettes, Get Coke out of Seattle Schools, and Million Mom March),
advocates were able to attract significant and favorable national media attention. In
some cases, national organizations with media savvy and resources helped to develop
and implement the media strategy (Stop Alcopops, Fight Kool Cigarettes Marketing,
and Alcohol Free Sports TV). Although industry opponents generally avoided direct
confrontation with advocates’ media claims, their ongoing national advertising and
public relations efforts provided opportunities for them to broadcast positive images of
the corporate products and practices that were challenged by the campaigns.
Another form of media that some groups used was the Internet, and several showed
creativity in adapting this interactive medium to their needs. The Million Mom March
did most of its national organizing online and was thus able to bring in groups of moth-
ers from around the country, both as organizers and participants, in the national march
(Wallack, Winter, & Nettekoven, 2004). Ban Trans Fats asked supporters to send e-mail
messages to Kraft Foods protesting the sale of Oreo cookies high in trans fats in
schools, a strategy that led Kraft to pull the product from the school market and intro-
duce a new Oreo without trans fats, in part out of fear that the e-mail communication
would lead to a growing boycott (Burros, 2003).
Importance of Context
Our review of the case histories suggests that the social context in which advocates
and industry compete for the dominant interpretation of corporate practices is a critical
component to the success or failure of campaigns to change corporate practices. For
example, a comparison of the campaigns to change the practices of tobacco corpora-
tions and gun manufacturers illustrates the importance of national and local popular
opinion, elected officials’ willingness to act on the issue, and the role of mainstream
news media in influencing the more favorable outcomes for the tobacco control than the
gun control advocates. In some cases, the cumulative impact of previous campaigns
may have created a more favorable climate for advocates, as in the case of efforts to
change food industry practices in the current decade, and the campaign to remove Kool
Mixx from the market, which built on the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement.
In other cases, the shifting social and political climate during the course of campaigns
suggests the importance of context. For example, when the Seattle-based campaign to
remove Coca-Cola from the public schools was launched in 1996, the school district was
facing a budget crisis, and many board members felt the financial opportunities presented
by the Coke contract were too valuable to pass up. During the course of the campaign,
however, public concern about childhood obesity grew, helping to create a climate in which
the board could no longer ignore advocates’ concerns without the threat of litigation.
Outcomes and Impact
As we moved from description of the campaigns to assessment of their impact, our
findings are perforce more suggestive than definitive. Nevertheless, each of the 12 cam-
paigns achieved at least some success in affecting corporate practices or raising public
awareness of the core campaign issues. The campaigns we reviewed led corporations to
stop production of certain health-damaging products (Uptown Cigarettes and, for a
time, alcopops), redesign products (SUVs), reduce access to unhealthy products (Coca
Cola in Seattle schools), change advertising practices (Kool cigarettes marketing,
Patient Channel drug advertising, newspaper gun advertising), and to label unhealthy
products (trans fats). Although we were not able to ascertain the health impact of these
activities, there is substantial plausible epidemiological evidence that these changes in
practices can contribute to improvements in health (Freudenberg, 2005).
The campaigns succeeded in educating and mobilizing diverse constituencies to raise
awareness of threats to health, to change individual behavior, and to participate in advo-
cacy efforts and the political process. In some cases, advocates mobilized thousands of
people to take action in their campaigns (e.g., Million Mom March for Gun Control,
Label or Ban Trans Fats). In other cases, a few organizations made changes that substan-
tially reduced exposure to harmful practices or products (e.g., Get Coke out of Seattle
Schools, Stop Patient Channel Drug Advertising, Close Loophole on Gun Advertising).
On a broader level, several campaigns both contributed to and benefited from broader
national changes in public perceptions of acceptable industry behavior (Get Coke out of
Seattle Schools, Stop Uptown Cigarettes, Fight Kool Cigarettes Marketing, Label or Ban
Trans Fats, Stop Alcopops, Improve SUV Fuel Efficiency, Strengthen California Emissions
Standards, Million Mom March for Gun Control, Lower Price of Norvir).
On another level, these campaigns suggested indicators that could be used to track the
success of campaigns in future research. For example, short-term markers of success
could include a campaign’s articulation of targeted changes in corporate practices and
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establishment of an ongoing coalition; intermediate markers could include success in
obtaining positive media coverage, reframing the issue in favorable terms, and achiev-
ing policy change; and long-term markers could include sustained changes in corporate
practices, norms, behavior, or health.
Factors Associated With Success
The diversity of goals and organizational complexity of many of the campaigns stud-
ied here suggests that the success of a campaign to modify health-damaging corporate
practices can be attributed to a range of factors. For our purposes, each campaign was
rated on two factors: its success in achieving its stated objectives and its success in
public education and mobilization. Using the rating methods described previously (1 =
fully successful, 5 = not successful), reviewers looked for evidence that the campaign
had achieved its primary and secondary objectives. Only those campaigns that fully
achieved their self-defined objectives were rated as fully successful (e.g., Stop Uptown
Cigarettes and Get Coca-Cola out of Seattle Schools), although partial success also con-
tributed to higher scores. In the public mobilization category, reviewers looked for evi-
dence that a campaign had galvanized people or institutions not previously involved
with the campaign’s work. Overall, four campaigns were rated as more effective in both
tasks, four as less effective in both, and the remaining four had split scores, suggesting
that for some campaigns, success in achieving objectives may be influenced by some-
what different factors than success in mobilizing constituencies.
The level at which campaigns operated seemed to influence its success. Although
both local and national campaigns were in the more effective category both on achiev-
ing goals and mobilizing constituencies, all three local campaigns (Get Coke out of
Seattle Schools, Stop Uptown Cigarettes, Fight Kool Cigarettes Target Marketing) were
rated as more effective in both tasks. National campaigns (8 of the 12 cases) were
divided between the more and less effective rating in both achieving goals and mobi-
lizing constituencies. It is noteworthy that the two campaigns that did not include a
national organization as the lead group (Coca Cola out of Seattle Schools and Stop
Uptown Cigarettes) were rated as most effective in achieving their objective. Both of
these groups did, however, collaborate with national groups.
Groups rated more or less effective did not differ in their primary targets; companies,
government bodies, and intermediary organizations were targeted by both more and less
successful campaigns, once again suggesting the importance of social, political, and
economic context. As noted earlier, for example, the growing concern about childhood
obesity may have been a factor in the success of the Get Coke out of Seattle Schools
campaign. Similarly, public ignorance or apathy may play a role in limited success.
Although Americans have recently become more concerned with the practices of the
pharmaceutical industry, no groundswell of public concern emerged during the course
of either selected campaign targeting this industry. More effective campaigns used more
advocacy strategies (5.3 versus 4.1) and involved more constituencies (6.3 versus 5.1)
than less effective ones.
DISCUSSION
Our study had several limitations. First, because it is not possible to identify the uni-
verse of public health campaigns, we were forced to select a convenience sample and
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cannot ascertain its representativeness. It is possible that our search methods led to an
oversampling of national campaigns or campaigns led by organizations with a greater
capacity to have an Internet presence. The campaigns were also not fully independent—
three were led by the same national group—perhaps biasing the results. In addition, we
were unable to ascertain through our methods the relative financial resources of each
campaign. Although we are aware of funding streams for certain campaigns, such as the
Master Settlement Agreement between tobacco corporations and state attorneys gen-
eral, it would have been ideal to compare budgets and resources across all 12 cam-
paigns. Also, for this study, we did not conduct interviews with campaign participants,
limiting our understanding to those provided by other accounts. In future research,
interviews with key participants can add deeper understanding.
Third, it was not possible to fully assess the effectiveness of campaigns using stan-
dardized measures, in part because of incomplete information and the limits of our
methods and in part because the diversity of campaign objectives, strategies, and dura-
tion make such systematic assessment difficult. In addition, although our decision to
use materials from mass media, advocacy reports, and Internet sites as well as peer-
reviewed publications provided more diverse viewpoints on the campaigns, these
sources lack the more uniform standards for evidence and consistency found in peer-
reviewed publications. Fourth, the campaigns studied here carried out their work in dif-
ferent time frames and for different durations. It is possible that a later assessment of
Table 3. Campaigns Ranked by Success
Score on Score on Rank on 
Success in Success in Combined Combined 
Campaign Goals Mobilization Score Score
1. Get Coke out of Seattle 1.0 1.3 2.3 1
Schools
2. Stop Uptown Cigarettes 1.0 2.0 3.0 2
3. Fight Kool Cigarettes 1.3 2.3 3.6 3
Target Marketing
4. Label or Ban Trans Fats 1.8 1.8 3.6 4a
5. Close Loophole on 1.8 2.5 4.3 5
Gun Advertising
6. Stop Alcopops 2.7 2.7 5.4 6
7. Alcohol Free Sports TV 3.3 2 5.5 7
8. Million Mom March 4.0 1.5 5.5 8a
for Gun Control 
9. Improve SUV Fuel 3.3 2.5 5.8 9
Efficiency
10. Strengthen California 3.2 2.7 5.9 10
Emissions Standards 
11. Stop Patient Channel 3.3 2.7 6.0 11
Drug Advertising 
12. Lower Price of Norvir 4.3 3.8 8.1 12
NOTE: Rating system: 1 = fully successful; 2 = significantly successful; 3 = partially successful;
4 = only a little successful; 5 = not successful.
a. In case of ties on combined scores, campaigns with higher score on goals ranked higher.
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the more recent campaigns would find differing levels of effectiveness. Finally, our rating
of effectiveness was based on a qualitative assessment of overall success in the two
tasks; it is possible that raters shared common biases that skewed results in some unsys-
tematic way. Despite these problems, we believe that our case studies accurately reflect the
most visible manifestations of this emerging domain of public health practice and that
the preliminary generalizations that we make provide a more solid foundation for future
health education practice and research.
Implications for Practice
The case studies show that public health advocates have successfully changed
health-damaging practices of industries and mobilized diverse constituencies to join
these campaigns. These campaigns have operated on local, state, and national levels and
targeted industry, government, and other types of organizations. Although most cam-
paigns did not fully achieve their objectives, all successfully mobilized some con-
stituencies and contributed to public discussion of relevant health issues. Furthermore,
with an average duration of 6 years (with some campaigns still ongoing), organizers
demonstrated an ability to sustain activities over time. The variability in success implies
that health educators, advocates, and researchers need to continue to collaborate to
identify characteristics of effective campaigns.
Although based on a small convenience sample, our findings suggest some charac-
teristics associated with success. For example, local campaigns may be more effective in
achieving their objectives than national ones, perhaps because they set more modest
goals or defined a more manageable scope of activities. Both the Stop Uptown Cigarettes
and Get Coke out of Seattle Schools campaigns worked to convince a single organiza-
tion to make a single decision, and in each case, the campaign was able to mobilize a
cross-section of constituencies in support of this goal. In comparison, the Million Mom
March had a more complex objective of stronger gun control laws and no clear target and
failed to achieve its policy goals. At the same time, the national campaigns Lower the
Price of Norvir, Improve SUV Fuel Efficiency, and the Million Mom March attracted
national media attention and helped to educate more people than did local campaigns. In
summary, campaigns at different levels may offer different benefits, requiring advocates
to select the level of intervention based not only on their capacity but also their goals.
Campaigns that involve multiple stakeholders appear to be more effective than those
that involve fewer. Other evidence also shows that involvement of diverse groups
increases the effectiveness of public health campaigns (Israel, Schulz, Parker, &
Becker, 1998; Minkler & Wallerstein, 1997; Zaza, Briss, & Harris, 2005), perhaps as a
result of mobilizing a wider cross-section of the population to pressure decision mak-
ers to act. For example, the Alcohol Free Sports TV campaign elicited support from uni-
versity coaches and federal legislators as well as public health scientists and advocates,
allowing the campaign to remain visible over time. In some cases, the campaigns forged
unusual new alliances that may contribute to future gains. In Chicago, for example,
AIDS activists joined with senior citizens to protest price hikes by Abbott Laboratories,
the maker of Norvir, an AIDS drug, and other medications. In Stop Uptown Cigarettes,
African American church groups, health professionals, and civil rights activists joined
forces, a constellation that was recreated in later campaigns elsewhere.
Government players came down on different sides of the battle in these campaigns,
depending in part on the broader political forces acting on the public officials involved.
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In Fight Kool Cigarettes Marketing, several state attorneys general helped advocacy
groups to win resources for prevention from the tobacco industry and in Strengthen
California Auto Emissions, the California Air Resources Board, a key player, was itself
a quasi-governmental agency. On the other hand, in the campaigns Lower the Price of
Norvir and Get Coke out of Seattle Schools, government was the target of advocates’
actions, the agent for forcing changes in corporate practices. In some cases, sympathetic
health officials played a more covert role, providing advocates with information even if
their employers were neutral or opposed to the campaign. Overall, our cross-case com-
parison suggests that government actors typically function as intermediaries between
corporations and campaigns regardless of their bias toward one side of the debate. In
some cases, government efforts to forge a compromise reflected a helpful effort to
achieve results in a charged political environment, whereas in others, government
appeared to undercut its mandate to protect public health by accommodating the needs
of special interest groups that harm health.
Most campaigns used multiple strategies, a practice associated with effectiveness,
and advocates noted that each contributed to the other. For example, public activities
led to media coverage, which in turn raised public and policy maker awareness (Fight
Kool Cigarettes Marketing, Lower Price of Norvir, Label or Ban Trans Fats). Several
advocates remarked that litigation or the threat of litigation was a powerful strategy.
Recently, Michael Jacobsen, executive director of CSPI, a national advocacy organiza-
tion involved with several of the campaigns described here, told a reporter, ‘‘We used
to file all sorts of complaints with the government. Sometimes we’d get a response, but
usually nothing happened. Now, when we have told companies that we’re going to sue
them, they show up in our offices the next week’’ (Warner, 2006, p. C3).
Contextual issues also affect the success of a campaign. Differences in the political
climate for tobacco and gun control affected the outcomes of these campaigns, perhaps
because gun advocates had a powerful mobilized constituency (i.e., the National Rifle
Association), whereas Big Tobacco generally lacked genuine grassroots support
(Nathanson, 1999). The relative lack of success of the two campaigns against the phar-
maceutical industry may reflect that industry’s strong political influence in the recent
past (Angell, 2004). These findings suggest that sensitivity to changing political contexts
is critical in campaign planning. For example, growing concerns about obesity may
increase public sympathy toward advocates targeting the food industry, a contextual
change that may make the next 5 years a fertile time for targeting the food industry.
Overall, we did not observe dramatic differences in campaign dynamics across
industries, even though the six industries differ significantly in the variable impact of
their products on health (e.g., tobacco versus food). Although further study with larger
samples is needed, the similarities of tactics and strategies that both sides use in these
campaigns suggest the value of studying advocacy campaigns across industries.
Our review of the frames that these campaigns used identified common themes
across industries. Several campaigns focused on children and youth, a target for pro-
tection morally acceptable to many sectors of the population. Others have noted the
American tradition of framing advocacy campaigns around children (Wallack &
Lawrence, 2005) and also the risk of leaving out more stigmatized populations such as
low income, immigrant communities, and adults in communities of color, also often tar-
geted by industries promoting dangerous products. In the 12 campaigns we studied,
industry often sought to frame issues around freedom and rights, particularly the right
of individuals to make consumer choices. In some cases, advocates were able to turn
these frames around and argue that communities had the right to choose what products
to accept. As Charyn Sutton (1993), a spokesperson for the campaign explained,
The Uptown struggle was one of taking back the issue of choice and redefining it in a
larger community context, rather than an individual context. Excessive tobacco advertis-
ing in African American communities push tobacco products in a way that takes away
choice.…The Coalition believed that African Americans were exercising their right of free
choice—by rejecting Uptown. (p. 11)
In this way, several groups introduced a social justice frame—pressing for an interpre-
tation of health-damaging corporate practices as not only a legal concern but also one
of achieving health equality or “health justice” for all communities, regardless of
inequality in economic resources.
For example, the Seattle Citizen’s Campaign for Commercial Free Schools noted
that “a world-class educational system does not ask its children to consume high-sugar,
high-fat food in order to refurbish its ping pong tables nor ask them slake their thirst
with caffeinated sugary drinks in order to play sports after school” (Ervin, 2002, p. B1)
Others have noted that such moral arguments have been successful in winning support
for other health-related campaigns, such as legislation or ballot initiatives to guarantee
living wages or to reduce gun violence (Gertner, 2006; Wallack & Lawrence, 2005).
Truth and honesty served as effective frames for advocates, as several of our cam-
paign histories bear out. After the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers ran ads oppos-
ing stricter fuel emission standards by claiming that cars were “virtually pollution free,”
the Union of Concerned Scientists (2004), a participant in Strengthen California
Emission Standards, mobilized 25,000 people to complain to the Federal Trade
Commission about deceptive advertising. Similarly, after the Label or Ban Trans Fats
campaign ran national ads accusing McDonald’s of going back on its promise to replace
trans fats in its French fries, McDonald’s reached a settlement with the advocacy group
that included paying the American Heart Association $7 million to run an educational
campaign on trans fats (“McDonald’s Settles,” 2005)
Finally, many of the campaigns used health promotion as a central theme or frame.
In most of the campaigns, the motivating force guiding advocates was a desire to pro-
tect the well-being of populations they cared about. For example, the Fight Kool
Cigarettes Marketing campaign was run by the National African American Tobacco
Prevention Network, which stressed their interest in protecting hip-hop culture from
appropriation by corporate interests.
This [Kool Cigarettes Marketing Campaign] is a slick scheme by KOOL to exploit Black
culture and music to market deadly tobacco products which are known to kill . . . we will
resist this sinister marketing effort by KOOL to target Black youth and the hip-hop culture.
We will pursue every means necessary to educate and mobilize the Black community and
all people of conscience to stop this effort. (National African American Tobacco Prevention
Network, 2004)
In the two automobile-centered campaigns, protection of the environment also
played a role. Although targeted industries tried to change the subject (e.g., by focusing
on freedom to choose products) or to question the scientific evidence demonstrating
harm, in these campaigns companies were generally not successful in shifting the focus
entirely away from health, thus limiting their ability to defeat campaigns. With special-
ized training in how to bring health issues to various populations, health educators may
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be able to make an important contribution to campaigns to change health-damaging cor-
porate practices.
In summary, health advocates may be able to increase their effectiveness in changing
health-damaging industry practices by following the lead of successful campaigns. For
example, they can use frames that have been demonstrated to mobilize diverse con-
stituencies, such as linking health messages with the related themes of fairness and social
justice (Dorfman et al., 2005). Despite the success of campaigns in changing corporate
practices, advocates face a basic quandary in framing their objectives. On one hand, defin-
ing an objective narrowly (e.g., asking one company to withdraw one brand of a harmful
product, such as Uptown cigarettes) may be easier to achieve but, on the other hand, have
less health impact than a more general effort to eliminate a harmful product line.
More broadly, assessing the scope of the impact of any single campaign illustrates
the limits of using campaigns as a unit of analysis. No campaign is likely to be able to
overcome by itself the powerful interests that promote legal but lethal products. Rather,
it may be that the ultimate effect will be the cumulative impact of many campaigns that
change public norms, motivate elected officials, and convince industry that their long-
term profitability may be at risk if they fail to heed the health concerns of the public.
In our view, campaigns to modify corporate practices may be elements of a nascent
movement that seeks to redraw the lines between the public sector and the free market.
Our review of these cases suggests that some elements of a movement may be in place
(e.g., national resource organizations, common messages and frames, and a common
repertoire of tactics and strategies). In other important ways, however, these efforts do not
yet meet the usual definition of a social movement, such as common grievances, a shared
common agenda, an ability to coordinate on the local and national levels, or visible
national leadership (Snow, Soule, & Kriesi, 2004). Unlike the consumer movement of the
later mid-20th century or the environmental movement of the 1970s and 1980s, current
mobilizations to modify health-damaging corporate practices do not yet have a consistent
voice in Washington, the media, or the mainstream political parties. Both activists and
public health professionals may benefit from considering what steps would move the
activities described here into a more coherent national force for protecting health.
Implications for Research
On the research side, our preliminary case study analysis suggests questions that
require additional study. How can the cumulative adverse public health impact of cor-
porate practices be measured? To what extent are campaigns such as those studied here
an effective means to curb this impact? What are the social and economic costs of these
campaigns? Under what circumstances do their health benefits outweigh these costs?
What is the cost-effectiveness of these strategies as compared to others (i.e., letting
market forces resolve the problem)? For campaigns that are successful, are there dif-
ferences in what strategies are most effective at the local and national levels?
Further research is also needed on the role of corporate practices on disparities. Only
a few of these campaigns were centered in primarily African American or Latino com-
munities. What are the unique characteristics of these efforts? If harmful corporate
practices play a role in amplifying disparities in health by targeting more vulnerable
groups, what is the potential for these campaigns to reduce such disparities?
These and similar questions suggest that continued research on the impact of corpo-
rate practices on health can contribute to the development of new strategies for health
promotion and disease prevention.
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